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Abstract 
The paper compares the extent of intergenerational earnings and educational correlation in Japan and 
France. It uses very similar repeated surveys that provide information on educational attainment and 
family background, conducted in Japan and France. To insure comparability, similar sample 
restrictions and specifications are imposed. For Japan, we use waves 1965, 1975, 1985, 1995 and 
2005. For France, we use waves 1965, 1970, 1977, 1985, 1993 and 2003. Intergenerational elasticity 
in years of education can be readily estimated using available information. On the other hand, 
intergenerational earnings elasticity cannot be directly measured given the lack of information on 
parental income in both surveys. This leads us to apply Bjorklund and Jantti(1999) two sample 
instrumental variables estimation strategy. Lastly, we discuss to what extent differences in earnings 
mobility is related to differences in educational mobility and to differences in returns to education 
between the two countries. 
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 1 Introduction
Inspired by the seminal work of Conlisk (1974), Atkinson (1981) and Becker and Tomes
(1979; 1986), a recent series of studies have examined the extent of income mobility across
generations in developed economies. They have revealed that in some countries a large
fraction, of up to one half, of economic advantage or disadvantage is transmitted from
one generation to the next, within families. There are, however, two important limitations
with existing empirical studies. First, available evidence have mostly concentrated on North
America and Western Europe. While they have revealed sizeable diﬀerences across countries
in the extent of income mobility, very little is known of other parts of the world, in particular
on Asian countries.1 Second, beyond the measurement of the degree of intergenerational
association, there is still considerable uncertainty regarding the structural determinants
of intergenerational income mobility. In particular, the extent to which diﬀerences in the
intergenerational mobility process, observed across countries and over time, are driven by
such key ingredients as labor market institutions, wage inequality and educational policy
is still unclear. This study provides an analysis of the extent of intergenerational mobility
in earnings and education in Japan, a country so far absent from empirical evaluations.
Furthermore, in order to provide a point of comparison for our results on Japan, and to
discuss factors aﬀecting the extent of intergenerational mobility, we undertake a comparison
with intergenerational mobility in France.
Several reasons make the study of intergenerational earnings mobility in Japan par-
ticularly interesting and relevant. One of them is that there is considerable uncertainty
regarding whether Japan exhibits high or low intergenerational mobility, in comparison
to other countries. On the basis of class mobility, Ishida, Goldthorpe and Erikson (1991)
conclude that Japan does not signiﬁcantly deviate from the “core” ﬂuidity model shared
by most industrialized societies. However, Ishida (1993) indicates that mobility is indeed
lower in Japan than in Britain and the United States and suggests that this may reﬂect
the crucial inﬂuence of educational strategies. At the same time, the Japanese society is
often seen as an equal society. This seems in particular the case on the labor market where
1Lillard and Kilburn (1995) and Grawe (2004) are two noteworthy exceptions who address the issue of
intergenerational earnings mobility in Malaysia, Nepal and Pakistan.
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tion of relatively low social mobility and limited cross-sectional income inequality leads to
ambiguous predictions regarding the extent of intergenerational earnings mobility : on the
one hand existing sociological evidence point to a low degree of mobility in education and
occupational status; on the other hand, the occupational hierarchy will be mapped into a
rather compressed earnings structure which may lead to a small degree of diﬀerentiation
in human capital accumulation strategies and overall, to a low degree of earnings mobil-
ity. This makes a strong case for reconsidering Japanese intergenerational mobility in a
comparative perspective. In so doing, one of our objective is to shed light on the old but
unsettled debate on Japanese “exceptionalism”.
In this respect, focusing on the transmission of income - rather than occupation, social
status or education - provides more than a useful complement to the standard sociological
studies of intergenerational mobility. There are two main reasons for studying income
mobility. First, income is a crucial determinant of individual well-being and not only, nor
primarily an aspect of individual socio-economic status - as taken into account in social
prestige scores - but more fundamentally. Hence the analysis of its transmission across
generations is of paramount importance from a welfare perspective. Second, the comparison
overtime and across countries of the extent social and educational mobility is often diﬃcult,
because of the lack of comparability of social and educational classiﬁcations and the need to
account for structural mobility. In comparison, the quantitative nature of income makes the
analysis of intergenerational income mobility more simple and comparisons across countries
and over time much easier.
Assessing whether a speciﬁc country displays high or low mobility in the absolute, is
often very diﬃcult. This is why we develop a comparative assessment of intergenerational
mobility in Japan and France. Several features of France’s socio-economic setting make
this country an interesting case for comparison. As far as its labor market is concerned,
France is largely viewed as a heavily regulated labor market, in which minimum wage and
collective bargaining result in a much more compressed wage structure than observed in
most developed economies, and where ﬁring costs translate into low rates of job mobility
over the career. These two features makes the French labor market close to the Japanese
Arnaud Lefranc, Fumiaki Ojima and Takashi Yoshida
2 EUI-WP RSCAS 2008/25 © 2008 Arnaud Lefranc, Fumiaki Ojima and Takashi Yoshidasituation. Things are less clear cut when it comes to the educational system. On the one
hand, the French education system is strongly hierarchical, in particular for higher educa-
tion, coming close, in this respect, to the Japanese case. On the other hand, the degree of
private monetary investment in children’s education seems much less pronounced in France,
where secondary and tertiary education is close to completely free of tuition fees. Hence
at ﬁrst sight, comparing France and Japan, in terms of their degree of intergenerational
earnings mobility, seems an interesting way to assess the contribution of the educational
system to the transmission of economic inequality.
Another argument for comparing Japan and France lies in the type of data available in
both countries. As discussed in several papers (Jenkins, 1987; Grawe, 2006), the measure-
ment of intergenerational mobility is very sensitive to speciﬁcation issues and seemingly
minor changes in the sample used or the estimated model can lead to large variations in
the estimation results. Hence, to conduct a meaningful international comparison of in-
tergenerational mobility requires that the same speciﬁcation be estimated in the diﬀerent
countries. We pay great attention to this aspect in our comparison of Japan and France.
In each country, our analysis relies on a several waves of a survey designed to study so-
cial mobility (the SSM survey in Japan and the FQP survey in France) and conducted at
regular interval since around 1960 (1955 for Japan and 1964 for France). One should em-
phasize that the type of information collected is very similar in each country. Furthermore,
since none of these surveys collects direct information on parental income, our estimation
for each country relies on Björklund and Jäntti (1997)’s two-sample instrumental variable
method.
Overall, Japan appears as a rather mobile society. Two main ﬁndings emerge from our
analysis. First, intergenerational earnings mobility in Japan appears rather high, compared
to what is usually found in Western developed countries. We ﬁnd an intergenerational
earnings elasticity of about .3 for Japan against around .5 for France. The value we ﬁnd
for Japan is slightly higher than the one found for Scandinavian countries and comparable
to Canadian estimates. It is lower than in continental Europe and all the more so than in
the US and UK. Second, the higher intergenerational earnings mobility found in Japan is
associated with both a relatively low return to education on the labor market and a high
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amounts in Japan to around .3, which is much lower than the value we ﬁnd for France and,
more generally, in many developed countries.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses a standard inter-
generational earnings transmission model and illustrates the relationship between earnings
mobility, labor market inequality and educational mobility. Section 3 presents the econo-
metric model. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 discusses our main results.
2 Theoretical model
To illustrate the main structural determinants of intergenerational income mobility and
to shed light on the interpretation of the commonly estimated intergenerational elasticity,
we developed a simpliﬁed theoretical model, borrowed from Solon (2004). This model
considers a simpliﬁed family model in which, at each period two generations coexist : one
parent (generation t−1) and one child (generation t). The parent is endowed with human
capital, earn income, consume and invest in the child’s human capital.
Let Yt−1 denote the parent’s income, Ct−1 her consumption and It−1 her investment in
her child’s human capital. The budget constraint for generation t − 1 is given by:
Ct−1 + It−1 = Yt−1 (1)
Following Solon, assume that the technology that translates parental investment in
child’s human capital is given by :
Ht = θlog(It−1) + et (2)
where H denotes human capital. This equation emphasizes two determinants of human
capital accumulation. The ﬁrst one consists in parental ﬁnancial investment, It−1. This
determinant should be understood in a broad sense, as including everything that money
can buy, i.e. all parental inﬂuences that are directly determined by parental monetary re-
sources. Direct education expenditures, such as tuition fees, are of course the most obvious
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capital through, for instance, the choice of residential location. In fact, residential location
is likely to inﬂuence human capital accumulation through, for instance, the composition
of the peer groups or in cases where the allocation of pupils to schools is based on resi-
dential area. To the extent that location decisions are constrained by family income, this
determinant is also captured by It−1. As discussed, for instance, in Becker and Tomes
(1986) and Mulligan (1997), the reason why parental ﬁnancial investment matters is that
human capital accumulation cannot easily be ﬁnanced from borrowing, in the presence of
imperfect capital markets. Second, all other determinants of human capital attainment,
including individual ability, aspirations, parental non-monetary investment,... Two com-
ments must be added regarding the functional form adopted here. The parameter θ is an
index of the productivity of parental ﬁnancial investment for human capital accumulation.
The logarithmic speciﬁcation implies that parental investment have a decreasing marginal
eﬀect on child’s human capital.
The second determinant of human capital accumulation are non-ﬁnancial determinants,
denoted by et. This variable captures the combined inﬂuences of nature, nurture, social
and cultural origin outside the causal impact of parental ﬁnancial investment. Of course,
such inﬂuences are likely to be transmitted within families and so will be correlated across
generations. Following Becker and Tomes (1979), assume that et follows a ﬁrst-order au-
toregressive process of the form:
et = δ + λet−1 + νt (3)
In this equation, ν is a random term independent of et−1. This equation amounts to saying
that a fraction λ of parental non-monetary determinants of human capital are passed
on to the next generation. Consequently, even in the absence of ﬁnancial investment by
the parents, human capital endowments will be correlated across generations, for reasons
abundantly discussed in the social and educational mobility literature.
Lastly, individual income is determined by the amount of human capital using the
following function :
logYt = µ + pHt (4)
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To discuss parental investment, assume that the parent chooses her consumption and




subject to the constraints of equations 1 to 4. In the utility function, the coeﬃcient α
represents the degree of “altruism” of the parents or equivalently the weight of child’s
welfare in the parent’s utility function.
Solving the above program, Solon shows that the optimal ﬁnancial investment in the
child’s human capital is given by :
It−1 =
αθp
1 − α(1 − θ)p
Yt−1 (6)
Hence parental ﬁnancial investment is increasing in parental income, parental altruism, the
returns to human capital and the eﬃciency of human capital investments.
Substituting for optimal investment in equations 2 and 4, Solon also shows that the
relationship between the income of consecutive generations is given by :
logYt = µ + θplog[
αθp
1 − α(1 − θ)p
] + θplogYt−1 + pet (7)
A similar equation applies to the relationship between the human capital endowment of
successive generations.
Two sources of intergenerational correlation in income are embedded in equation 7. The
obvious one is captured by the coeﬃcient θp on logYt−1. It corresponds to the “ﬁnancial
channel” already discussed. One should note that since the investment in children’s human
capital rises with the returns to human capital, the eﬀect of parental income on child’s
income is also an increasing function of both p and θ. The second source of intergenerational
transmission arises from the term pet. Since the endowment in human capital is correlated
across generations, independently of ﬁnancial decisions, so will income.
Lastly, it should be noted that the linear regression of logYt on logYt−1 suggested by
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particular, the estimated coeﬃcient on parent’s income will diﬀer from the structural term
θp and will not measure the causal eﬀect of parental income on child’s income. The reason
is that the endowment in human capital et is not usually observable and will be part of the
error term in the equation. However, this component of the error term is correlated with
parent’s income. Hence, the estimated coeﬃcient on parent’s income will capture both the
ﬁnancial channel and all other sources of intergenerational correlation in earnings. More
precisely, as shown in Solon, in the steady state of the intergenerational income transmission





As is common in the literature on intergenerational earnings mobility, our objective is to
estimate the standard log-linear regression model in permanent income :
Yi = β0 + βXi + ei (8)
where, with a slight change in notations, Yi denotes the logarithm of the child’s permanent
income in family i and Xi the logarithm of his or her father’s permanent income. β
represents the intergenerational elasticity in earnings (IGE), i.e. the percent variation in
child’s income associated with a one percent change in father’s income.
Estimating equation 8 imposes very stringent data requirements since it requires that
permanent income (i.e. the full sequence of earnings over the entire working career) of
both children and fathers be observed. Such requirements will of course rarely be met in
existing data sets. In our case, available data is much more limited. For children we only
observe current earnings. In the case of their fathers, we only have information on their
education and occupation.
Despite not having direct information on father’s income, it is still possible to estimate
the IGE, using an imputation procedure commonly referred to as two-samples instrumental-
The Intergenerational Transmission of Income and Education: A Comparison of Japan and France
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lund and Jäntti (1997). However the fact that we only observe current income, and not
permanent income, implies that we pay special attention to the possible lifecyle biases that
may arise in the estimation of the IGE, as discussed in a recent paper by Grawe (2006).
3.1 Two samples instrumental variables estimation
The basic principles behind two samples instrumental variables is as follows. Equation 8
cannot be directly estimated since we do not observe father’s income. However we observe
a set of father’s socio-demographic characteristics. These characteristics can be used to
form a prediction of father’s income. And one can show that substituting this predicted
income for father’s actual income X
f
i in the estimation still allows to correctly estimate
the IGE. In this procedure, the prediction of father’s income relies on an auxiliary sample,
representative of the fathers’ population, and in which we observe both income and the
same socio-demographic characteristics that are available in the main sample, i.e. the one
containing information on children and their fathers’ characteristics.
Let Zi denote a set of socio-demographic characteristics (e.g. education) of the father
of a family indexed by i, that is part of a sample of families I. Assume that father’s income,
Xi can be written as :
Xi = Ziγ + υi (9)
where υi is an error term independent of Zi. Xi is not observed in sample I. Yet, if there
exists a sample J from the same population as I, it can be used to provide an estimate ˆ γ
of γ, derived from the estimation of :
Xj = Zjγ + υj + uj (10)
for family j in the sample J. Equation 10 uses current earnings Xjt to assess the impact
of the variables Z
f
j on permanent earnings Xj. u
f
jt is a time-varying residual.
From the estimation of equation 10 , one can form a prediction of father’s earnings in
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Yi = β0 + β(Ziˆ γ) + vi (11)
where the residual vit is given by vi = ei + ui + βυi + β(Z
f
i (γ − ˆ γ)) and is independent of
other regressors.
Our estimates of the IGE are based on the estimation of equations 10 and 11 on separate
samples, described in the following section.
This estimation procedure appears as a special case of the split sample instrumental
variables estimator introduced in Angrist and Krueger (1995) and Arellano and Meghir
(1992). As shown in these papers, it is asymptotically equivalent to the standard instru-
mental variables procedure if samples I and J are drawn from the same population.
At this point one should emphasize that not having direct information on father’s
earnings represents a minor limitation. The argument unfolds as follows. Assume we had a
direct measure of fathers yearly income for a single year. As discussed in Solon (1992; 1999),
the existence of transitory earnings components in yearly income would have introduced
the well-known error-in-variables attenuation bias in the estimation of the IGE, had we
estimated equation 8 based on this direct measure of father’s earnings. To circumvent this
bias, we would have been led to rely on instrumental variables estimation, as used, for
instance in Dearden, Machin and Reed (1997). But the procedure we implement is exactly
equivalent to standard IV estimation.2
The speciﬁcation of the ﬁrst-step estimation, used to predict father’s income, is pre-
sented in the appendix. In short, in the ﬁrst-step, yearly income is regressed on a set of
education dummies interacted with birth cohort -which allows for the possibility of change
over time in the returns to education. The speciﬁcation also includes a control for age and
allows for separate age-earnings proﬁle by level of education.3
2For more details on the properties of IV estimates for the estimation of the IGE, see Solon (1992) and
Björklund and Jäntti (1997).
3We use a fourth-order polynomial in age and drop non-signiﬁcant higher order terms.
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The most important limitation of the data used in this paper - and in fact of almost all
data sets used in the analysis of intergenerational earnings mobility4 - is that it does not
allow to observe permanent income but only conveys information on income earned over a
short period. In our case, we only observe yearly earnings.
When estimating equation 8 using yearly income, it is crucial, especially in comparative
work, to pay great attention to the life-cycle biases that can arise in the estimation of
the IGE. This point has been emphasized recently in Grawe (2006). The main result
of Grawe’s paper is that the IGE rises with the age at which children’s yearly earnings
are observed. This is due to the fact that earnings growth rate, over the life-cycle, is
positively correlated with permanent earnings. Hence, early in the life-cycle inequality
in yearly earnings understate inequalities in permanent earnings. So using early career
earnings make children appear more equal than they really are and leads to underestimate
the intergenerational transmission of inequality. Or equivalently, to overestimate mobility.
On the contrary, yearly earnings inequality late in the life-cycle is typically larger than
permanent earnings inequality. Using late career earnings for children will consequently
lead to underestimate mobility. A reversed reasoning implies that the estimated IGE falls
with the age at which father’s yearly earnings are observed.
For this reason, it is important that in both countries, we observe children and fathers
at the same age. However, this is not enough. First, if the slope of age-earnings proﬁles
diﬀer in France and Japan, the life-cycle bias will diﬀer between the two countries and
estimates will not be comparable. Second, even if age-earnings proﬁle are similar across
countries, estimating model 8 using yearly earnings may come far from providing a good
estimate of the permanent income IGE. The rule of thumb suggested by Grawe is to restrict
the sample to children and fathers aged about 40. This corresponds roughly to the middle
of the career and earnings diﬀerentials at the age of 40 can be considered representative
of permanent earnings diﬀerentials. If we are willing to assume that this is true for both
Japan and France, then estimates of intergenerational mobility at the age of 40 are directly
comparable.
4One of the very rare exceptions is Mazumder (2001).
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life-cycle eﬀects in the estimation of the IGE by including an interaction term between
individual age and father’s earnings, as done in Lee and Solon (2006). The equation is then
given by :
Yit = β0 + β ˆ Xi + Σ4
j=1γj(agei − 40)j (12)
+Σ4
j=1δj ˆ Xi × (agei − 40)j + eit (13)
where Y c




i ˆ γ denotes father’s predicted log
earnings, age denotes child’s age. The fourth order interaction between age and predicted
income takes into consideration the impact of children’s age on the IGE. In this equation
β measures the IGE at the age of 40 (at this age, all the interaction terms are zero).
Of course, life-cycle eﬀects also need to be adequately dealt with in the prediction of
fathers’ earnings. In the estimation of 12, we use a prediction of fathers’ earnings at the
age of 40. This implies that β comes close to measure the IGE in permanent income. More
details on the estimation of the ﬁrst-step equation are provided in the appendix.
4 Data
4.1 Japan : the SSM surveys
Our Japanese data come from the Social Stratiﬁcation and Mobility (SSM) surveys. The
SSM survey has been the primary data source for studies of social and educational mobility
in Japan (Ishida, 1993; Ojima, 1998; Imada, 2000). The ﬁrst wave of the survey was
conducted in 1955 by the Japanese Sociological Society. Since then, similar surveys were
conducted at intervals of ten years by independent organizations.
The earliest waves (1955, 1965 and 1975) focused only on males. A female sample was
collected since the 1985 survey. The questionnaire of the last wave of the survey (2005)
has also been used for similar surveys in Korea and Taiwan. In this paper, we make use of
all available waves of the SSM surveys.
The SSM samples are designed to provide a national representative sample of the popu-
lation between 20 and 70 years old. Across the diﬀerent waves, the size of the male sample
The Intergenerational Transmission of Income and Education: A Comparison of Japan and France
EUI-WP RSCAS 2008/25 © 2008 Arnaud Lefranc, Fumiaki Ojima and Takashi Yoshida 11varies between two and three thousands individuals. The questionnaire focuses on the de-
scription of social status, educational attainment, social origin, class identiﬁcation and the
perception of inequality.
The most two important variables in our analysis are income and educational attain-
ment. The income variable available in the SSM surveys is individual primary income,
which includes both labor and asset income before any tax or transfer. For most indi-
viduals of working age and who actually work, the primary component of pre-ﬁsc income
is labor earnings. Income is available in all waves of the survey in bracketed form. The
bounds and number of brackets vary across waves. In the regressions, we deal with these
brackets using two diﬀerent routes. The ﬁrst one amounts to assign the mid-value of the
bracket and use standard linear regression techniques; the second it to explicitly take into
account the discrete nature of our income information and use interval regression.
The education classiﬁcation used in the surveys varies across waves and cohort, reﬂect-
ing the changes in the Japanese educational system that occurred over the last century. For
older cohorts, the classiﬁcation distinguishes between ﬁve educational levels : elementary
school (6 years of formal schooling), upper elementary (8 years), middle School (11 years),
college (14 years) and university (17 years). For more recent cohorts, the ﬁve educational
levels are : junior high school (9 years), high School (12 years), junior college (14 years),
university (16 years) and graduate school (18 years). Given sample size and to assure
cross-year consistency of the education classiﬁcation, we used a reduced classiﬁcation that
distinguishes between three educational levels : lower secondary education (or lower), up-
per secondary education and tertiary education. This corresponds, for instance, to the
classiﬁcation used in Kondo (2000).
For each individual, the survey also reports his/her father’s education and occupation.
These items are reported ex post by the survey respondents.
4.2 France : the FQP surveys
Our French data are taken from the Formation-Qualiﬁcation-Profession (FQP - Education-
Training-Occupation) surveys conducted by the French National Statistical Agency (IN-
SEE). We use all six waves of the survey (1964, 1970, 1977, 1985, 1993 and 2003). Each
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of individuals surveyed varies across waves : 25 000 individuals in 1964, 38 000 in 1970,
1977, 1985 and 2003 and 19 000 in 1993.
This survey has been the primary data source for studies of social and intergenerational
mobility in France, as well as a wide range of labor market issues. It contains detailed
information on education, labor market outcomes (industry, occupation, number of months
worked full- and part-time and annual earnings in the previous year). It also provides data
on social origin (including both parents occupation and education).
The income variable in the survey is total labor earnings in the previous year. This
information is not available for self-employed workers. It does not include other sources of
income such as asset income or transfers. In 1964, annual earnings are recorded in interval
form, using 9 intervals. Hence, all estimations results reported for wave 1964 are based on
interval regression.
For both children and parents, a detailed (10 levels) classiﬁcation of educational at-
tainment is available that distinguishes between general and vocational education. The
classiﬁcation, however, changed several times over the six waves and was recoded in time-
consistent way. The classiﬁcation used in this paper distinguishes between the following
six levels of education : higher education degree, upper secondary education degree, lower
secondary education general , degree lower secondary education vocational degree, primary
education degree, no degree.
4.3 Samples restrictions and matching
The analysis in this paper is conﬁned to the study of intergenerational mobility between
fathers and sons. There are two reasons to this. The ﬁrst is that females were only sampled
in the SSM data starting in 1985. This clearly prevents to analyze the impact of mothers
socio-economic status on child’s achievement, although it would still be possible to examine
the extent of intergenerational mobility between fathers and daughters. One diﬃculty,
though, is that the sample of women who participate in the labor force and earn labor
income is not a representative sample of the female population. Solving such self-selection
5More precisely, for all waves except the last two, the survey is based on a stratiﬁed sample of the French
population. Adjusting for weights has only a minor impact on the estimates.
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EUI-WP RSCAS 2008/25 © 2008 Arnaud Lefranc, Fumiaki Ojima and Takashi Yoshida 13problems, would require to explicitly model the interplay between labor force participation,
employment and earnings. For this reason, we concentrate on the male sample and leave
the analysis of intergenerational mobility between father and daughter to future research.
In the main samples used in this paper to estimate both the ﬁrst- and the second-step
equation, we exclude self-employed and those without positive earnings in the year preced-
ing the survey. This restriction is imposed to assure the comparability of the populations
studied in both countries, since in France, we do not observe earnings for self-employed
workers. Given the prevalence of self-employment in the father’s cohorts, in both countries,
it is however crucial to assess the incidence of this sample restriction. We discuss this point
below and show that this incidence is, as much as we can tell, limited.
The sample used in the estimation of the ﬁrst-step equation draws on most available
survey waves, for both countries : 1955, 1965, 1975, 1985 and 1995 in Japan; 1964, 1970,
1977, 1985, 1993 and 2003 in France. In the Japanese case, the sample is restricted to
individuals aged 25 to 54 years old. The main reason for excluding individuals older than
55, is that this used to be the common retirement age in private companies in Japan, in the
fathers’ cohorts. In France, the estimation is based on individuals aged 25 to 60 years. The
only reason for considering a wider age range is that the oldest wave available in France is
1964, against 1955 of Japan. Hence, it is necessary to include older workers in the analysis
to estimate earnings diﬀerentials among older cohorts.
Second-step estimations are based on the three most recent waves in both countries
(1985, 1995 and 2005 for Japan; 1985, 1993, 2003 for France). For reasons already dis-
cussed, the sample is restricted to individuals aged between 30 and 50 years old, i.e. close
to the middle of their working career. For each individual in the second-step sample, we
form a prediction of his father’s earnings using estimates of the ﬁrst-step equation. The
prediction is based on reported father’s education, as well as father’s cohort. In most cases,
individual in the second-step sample report their father’s birth year. In this case, we use
the relevant cohort-speciﬁc returns to education to predict father’s income. When informa-
tion on father’s birth year is not available, the matching procedure used is the following.
Based on individual birth year and available information, we compute the distribution of
father’s birth cohort. The prediction of father’s income is then the weighted average of
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distribution of father’s birth cohort.
5 Results
5.1 First-step estimation
We ﬁrst discuss the results of the ﬁrst-step equation used in the prediction of father’s earn-
ings. Figure 1 presents the evolution over time of educational attainment in both countries,
by birth cohort. In Japan, at the beginning of the century, the educational attainment of
the vast majority of the male population (more than 60%) is lower secondary education or
less. In fact, a signiﬁcant fraction of this group only received elementary education. The
rest of the population is shared evenly among the two other educational levels (upper sec-
ondary education and tertiary education). Throughout the twentieth century, three main
periods need to be distinguished. The ﬁrst period starts at the beginning of the century
and ends in the early 1930’s. It witnesses a fall in the share of the population with a
lower secondary education or lower and a rise in the share of individuals with an upper
secondary education. In the meantime, the share of individuals with a tertiary education
remains constant. The second period corresponds to the period of fast economic develop-
ment that occurred after world war II, i.e. cohorts born between the mid-1930’s and 1960.
This period sees an acceleration of the fall in the share of the population with a lower
secondary education, a continuation of the rise of upper secondary education and take-oﬀ
in the share of the population with access to university. The third period corresponds to
cohorts born in the 1960’s and after. During this period, the distribution of education
remains roughly constant : about 40% of the population access university; a little less then
60% reach upper secondary education and very small percentage of the population has
lower secondary education or less.
The evolution of the educational distribution in France is in many respects similar to
Japan, although the share of each education category diﬀer, both initial and in the ﬁnal
period. Panel B of ﬁgure 1 provides the composition by education using an aggregated
classiﬁcation similar to the one used in Japan; panel C provides the detailed composition.
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has a primary education degree or lower. And about 80% of the population has a level of
education equal to or lower than lower secondary education. Again, the beginning of the
century is period of rise in access to education and this rise accelerates around the middle
of the century. However, while trends are somewhat similar, educational attainment is,
throughout the period, markedly lower in France than in Japan. For instance, at the end
of our period, the overall educational attainment in France remains lower than in Japan
: only about 35% of the population obtain a higher education degree and 20% reach the
level of upper secondary education.
Figure 2 presents the evolution over time of the earnings structure, by level of education.
The earnings diﬀerentials reported here are predicted earnings diﬀerentials at age 40, based
on the ﬁrst step regression. The experience of both countries in this respect strongly diﬀer.
Earnings diﬀerentials by level of education in Japan appear roughly constant over the
entire period. Only in the case of the earliest cohorts, do earnings diﬀerentials seem more
compressed than for most other cohorts.6 However, it is worth emphasizing that for all
cohorts, Wald tests conﬁrm the hypothesis that earnings diﬀerentials are constant. This
echoes the results in Kanomata (1998) indicating that earnings inequality has remained
fairly stable in Japan in the second part of the century.
On the contrary, France experiences a marked decline in the returns to education. The
largest fall occurs between cohorts born at the beginning of the century and early baby-
boomers born around 1940. Two main factors account for this fall in returns to education.
The ﬁrst one is the massive wage compression that occurred at the end of the 1960 (in
particular in 1968, after the 1/3 rise in the minimum wage) and in the early 1970’s. The
second one is the competitive wage adjustment that followed the massive rise in the supply
of highly educated workers, as discussed in Goux and Maurin (2000).
Besides these discrepant evolutions, one should also stress that the Japanese earnings
structure appears very compressed, throughout the period. On the contrary, earnings
diﬀerentials are much stronger, in France, at the beginning of the period. In particular,
one should underscore here that the scale used on the vertical axis diﬀer between panels
6For the last two cohorts, we do not report the estimated earnings for the lowest group of education,
given the very small number of observations in this category
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A- Japan, linear regression
on interval midpoints B - France, linear regression
log(father’s Income) 0.251 0.224 0.462 0.473
(4.63) (2.86) (35.3) (24.54)
log(father’s Income) 0.009 0.007
*(age-40) (0.01) (3.38)
log(father’s Income) 0.001 0.000
*(age-40)2 (0.48) (-0.64)
n 987 987 13487 13487
R2 0.185 0.186 0.170 0.171
Notes : dependant variable is the logarithm of son’s annual earnings; T statis-
tics in parenthesis. For Japan, earnings are reported in brackets. For France,
the exact value is reported. Interval regression is estimated by maximum like-
lihood under the assumption that earnings are log-normally distributed.
A and B. However, as a result of the fall in returns to education that occurred throughout
the century, the returns to education in France, at the end of the period, appear more
comparable to Japanese levels.
5.2 Earnings mobility
We now turn to the analysis of intergenerational earnings mobility. Table 1 presents the
estimated IGE for earnings, when regressing sons’ earnings on fathers’ earnings predicted
from the previous section’s estimates.
The estimated value for Japan is .25 which represents a low value of the IGE and
indicates a rather strong intergenerational mobility. Since this coeﬃcient is an elasticity, the
interpretation of this value is that, on average, only one fourth of the previous generation’s
economic advantage or disadvantage survive to the next generation. By contrast, the
value of the IGE in France is twice as high and close to .5. If we go beyond the bilateral
comparison undertaken here, the value of the IGE for Japan still appears rather low by
international standards. Using the methodology implemented in this paper, Björklund and
Jäntti (1997) estimated an IGE for earnings of .52 for the United-States and .28 for Sweden.
Dearden, Machin et Reed (1997) report an estimate for Britain based on a procedure similar
to ours of .57 for sons. Evidence available for other countries and surveyed in Solon (2002)
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and Canada (Corak and Heisz, 1999) (β around .2 or lower) and an intermediate degree
of mobility for Germany (β=.34). In the light of available evidence, it is clear that Japan
stands out as a rather mobile country, from the point of view of the intergenerational
transmission of income.
Estimates in table 1 also emphasize the importance of an adequate treatment of life-
cycle biases when drawing international comparisons. Bases on a younger age group,
Lefranc and Trannoy (2005) report a value of the IGE for France around .4. Here, using
a sample of individuals closer to their mid-career and adding an interaction term between
father’s income and son’s age signiﬁcantly raises the value of the IGE. On the contrary, in
Japan, controlling for this interaction term tends to decrease the estimated IGE : this may
be explained by the fact that individuals in the Japanese sample tend to be, on average,
above the reference age of 40, at which we evaluate the IGE in the second speciﬁcation
reported in the table. This tends to increase the intergenerational earnings mobility gap
between the two countries. We now address the contribution of educational mobility to
this gap.
5.3 Educational mobility
The theoretical model of section 2 underlines several factors that may contribute to this
gap in intergenerational earnings mobility. First, intergenerational earnings mobility may
be lower because of a high correlation across generations in the level of human capital. At
the same time, for a given degree of educational mobility, earnings mobility will also appear
lower if the returns to education are higher.7
Table 2 evaluates the extent of intergenerational mobility in education in Japan and
France. Two sets of coeﬃcient are reported. The ﬁrst coeﬃcient is the raw correlation
coeﬃcient between son’s and father’s education. The second coeﬃcient is the coeﬃcient
on father’s education in the regression of son’s education is regressed on cohort dummies
and father’s education. Hence, this last coeﬃcient measures the intra-cohort educational
mobility. Note that in both cases, the number of years of education is not directly reported
7More precisely, this will only hold conditional on the degree of inequality in parent’s earnings.
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Intergenerational Intergenerational
correlation coeﬃcient regression coeﬃcient







Notes : for both countries and both generations,
the number of years of education is the num-
ber of formal years of schooling completed by
both father and son; the regression coeﬃcient
reported is for the regression of son’s years of
education on father’s years of education and co-
hort dummies; T statistics in parenthesis.
and we use the number of formal years of education completed.
Again Japan stands out as a rather mobile country. The regression coeﬃcient for years
of education is comparable to the value of the IGE for earnings, around .3. Again, this
value is markedly lower than the one found in France using the same method and sample
restrictions. In the latter country, the value of the intergenerational regression coeﬃcient
for education is close to .5. Hence the analysis of educational mobility entirely conﬁrms
the results obtained for earnings.
Lastly, one should emphasize that educational mobility also appears quite high when
compared to other countries. For instance, Couch and Dunn (1997) report a value of the
intergenerational regression coeﬃcient for years of education of .41 for the US. The value
they report for Germany is however slightly lower than what we ﬁnd in Japan here : .24.
5.4 Sensitivity analysis
As previously discussed in section 4, one of the limitations of the results discussed so far
is that they are only based on a sample from which self-employed sons and the sons of
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wage earner self-employed total
wage earner 987 137 1124
87.81% 12.19%
55.79% 26.65%
self employed 782 377 1159
67.47% 32.53%
44.21% 73.35%





wage earner self-employed total
wage earner 14175 4720 18895
75.02% 24.98%
92.01% 73.38%
self employed 1231 1712 2943
41.83% 58.17%
7.99% 26.62%
total 15406 6432 21838
Notes : numbers in bold are frequencies; normal case are row percentages and
italics are column percentages.
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A- Japan, linear regression
on interval midpoints B - France, linear regression
log(father’s Income) 0.312 0.311 0.4752413 0.483
(7.60) (2.86) (41.3) (28.56)
log(father’s Income) -0.002 0.008
*(age-40) (-0.34) (4.44)
log(father’s Income) 0.000 0.000
*(age-40)2 (0.01) (-0.58)
n 1769 1769 17960 17960
R2 0.209 0.209 0.174 0.175
Notes : dependant variable is the logarithm of son’s annual earnings; T statis-
tics in parenthesis. For Japan, earnings are reported in brackets. For France,
the exact value is reported. Interval regression is estimated by maximum like-
lihood under the assumption that earnings are log-normally distributed.
Table 5: Intergenerational educational mobility - sensitivity analysis
Intergenerational Intergenerational
correlation coeﬃcient regression coeﬃcient







Notes : for both countries and both generations,
the number of years of education is the num-
ber of formal years of schooling completed by
both father and son; the regression coeﬃcient
reported is for the regression of son’s years of
education on father’s years of education and co-
hort dummies; T statistics in parenthesis.
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of labor earnings data for self-employed workers as well as the fact that, for France, labor
earnings of self-employed workers are in most cases not observed. As table 3 documents,
excluding self-employed children leaves aside a still relatively small fraction of the total rel-
evant population. On the other hand, excluding individuals whose father was self-employed
ignores a sizable share of the population (between 45 and 25 %).
To assess the impact of excluding self-employed fathers, we perform the following sen-
sitivity analysis. First, educational mobility is reassessed by estimating the correlation and
regression coeﬃcient on the sample where the restrictions on father’s employment status is
removed. Second, we re-estimate earnings mobility on the sample the total sample of non-
self-employed sons, regardless of their father’s employment status. Since for self-employed
fathers earnings are not observed reliably (if at all), we predict father’s earnings for this
category, based on the same ﬁrst step equation as in the previous section, i.e. estimated
on the sample of non-self-employed fathers.
Results are presented in table 4 for earnings and table 5 for educational mobility. In-
cluding the children of self-employed workers has very little impact on estimated coeﬃcient.
The larger change is in the estimated value of the intergenerational elasticity for earnings
that rises slightly in Japan, from .25 to .31. But given the precision of both estimates,
the diﬀerence is not signiﬁcant. In all other cases, the coeﬃcients stay almost exactly the
same.
Overall, excluding the children of self-employed workers from our sample does not
aﬀect our main conclusion. The sensitivity analysis suggests that intergenerational earnings
mobility may be slightly higher than estimated in the previous section, around .3. But the
main message remains. As far as the intergenerational transmission of income is concerned,
Japan appears as a highly mobile country, much more so that countries such as the US,
the UK or continental Europe.
6 Discussion and conclusion
In this paper, we have compared the extent of intergenerational earnings mobility in two
industrialized societies : Japan and France. On the one hand, the labor markets of these
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a large degree of on-the-job training and job-speciﬁc human capital, as well as a rather
compressed wage structure. On the other hand, among other things, these two countries
strongly diﬀer in terms of the organization of their educational systems. This is particu-
larly true of higher education. In Japan, access to higher education is often very expensive
and selective, forcing family to consciously elaborate complex educational strategies and
to undertake signiﬁcant ﬁnancial investments to support them. The extent of family in-
vestment in education in Japan has been abundantly documented. For instance families
cover between 71 and 86 % of the annual expenditures of university students (Kondo, 2000,
p6). Furthermore, besides tuition fees, parents often invest signiﬁcant amounts in “shadow
education” (Stevenson and Baker, 1992), such as cram schools and private tutoring. On
the opposite, the French higher education system is, at least at face value, free and open.
Of course, higher education in France is organized around a clear hierarchy, at the top of
which come the elite schools (grandes écoles) while universities represent the least presti-
gious form higher education. However, it is claimed that where students end up in this
hierarchical system is only based on individual merit. Which of the two countries display
the greatest level of intergenerational mobility, both in terms of income and education ?
The answer to this question is, indeed, surprising. As our estimates reveal, the degree
of intergenerational income mobility is much higher in Japan. Furthermore, this higher
mobility in terms of income is underpinned by a lower intergenerational correlation in
educational attainment.
Several factors are likely to account for the higher degree of income and educational
mobility observed in Japan. The ﬁrst explanation emphasizes the characteristics of the
educational system in both countries. As already discussed, both countries display a marked
hierarchy among higher education institutions. But the nature of this hierarchy and the
allocation procedure into higher education diﬀer greatly. The Japanese system is best
understood as a continuum of higher educational institutions of diﬀering quality (Ono,
2007). On the opposite, the most salient feature of the French system is the opposition
between elite graduate schools (grandes écoles) on the one hand and universities on the
other. This duality is more pronounced than the diﬀerences that exist among grandes écoles
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labor market (and social) outcomes. As a result of these diﬀerences, we would expect
individual outcomes to be more polarized in France than in Japan.
This is reinforced by the allocation procedure at work in both countries for access into
higher education. In Japan, the type and quality of college or university student have
access to is mostly determined by the results to a national exam that students take at the
end of high school.8 In France, all students take a national test a the end of high school
(baccalauréat). But the results to this test are not the primary determinants of the track
students will follow in the dual higher-education system. In fact, access to grandes écoles is
determined as the result of a national entrance competition taken two years after the end of
high school. But before taking this competition, students have to attend special preparatory
classes for at least two years. These special classes are for the most part free of tuition
but access to them is decided before the results of the national competition are known.
Furthermore, access largely reﬂects student aspirations, teachers’ recommendations and
the school district of origin. In this respect we would expect family and social background
to have a greater inﬂuence on student’s tertiary education attainment in France than in
Japan where scholastic results to a national contest plays a larger role. This corresponds
to a higher value of λ in the model of section 2.
The second explanation for the diﬀerences in the extent of earnings and educational
mobility between France and Japan lies in the low returns to education in this country.
Under these circumstances, investing in one’s children’s human capital may not be the
most proﬁtable investment for the parents. If so, lower parental investment will lead to
lower inequalities in human capital endowments and lower earnings inequality, hence more
mobility.
Two stylized facts seem to contradict this simple interpretation. First, despite low
returns to education, Japanese parents still devote a considerable share of their wealth to
their children’s education. Second, while the returns to education in Japan are low by
8More precisely, this is the case for those born after 1960 and who applied to national (or public)
universities. Most of applicants to private university take an entrance exam that is speciﬁc for each
university. And the national university has its own exam. So applicants for the national university should
take exams twice. In any case, allocation in the Japanese higher education system is mostly based on
examination results.
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observed in France.
The answer to these two counter-arguments emphasize the role of earnings inequality
among the parents. In the steady-state, the consequence of low returns to education is
not only that investment in human capital will be little proﬁtable. It is also that other
things equal, earnings diﬀerence will be small. In this case, parents may well invest a large
share of their income in their children’s education, in the end, if the distribution of income
is compressed, so will be the distribution of human capital in the next generation. This
is conﬁrmed by the analysis of “shadow education” undertaken in Stevenson and Baker
(1992), who emphasize the following three aspects of private investment in education in
Japan. First, family ﬁnancial investment is high on average. Second, such investment is
eﬃcient at improving educational attainment. But third, ﬁnancial investment and the use
of shadow education seem to vary little with characteristics of the family background such
as parental education or family income.
A similar argument may also help understand why intergenerational earnings and ed-
ucational mobility in France is so low, relative to Japan, despite current low returns to
education. In fact, what matters is not only the current returns but also their past value.
The former deﬁne the incentives for investing in children’s human capital. The latter de-
termine the degree of inequality of income among parents, i.e. in the source of investment.
Today’s French adults leave in a relatively equal world, but they are the children of a much
less equal world, that of post- world war II France. On the other hand, earnings inequality
in Japan have been rather limited throughout the twentieth century, which leaves less room
for a strong impact of parental ﬁnancial investment in their children on intergenerational
mobility.
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To predict father’s income, we rely on a ﬁrst-step equation in which yearly income is
regressed on a set of education dummies interacted with birth cohort. Hence, we allow for
the possibility of change over time in the returns to education. It is then possible to use
father’s education and birth cohort, as reported by the child, to form a prediction of his
father’s earnings.
In the ﬁrst-step equation, we do not use father’s occupation, although this information
is available in our data sets. Using reported father’s occupation to predict father’s income
raises some diﬃculties, given our objective, discussed in section 3 to predict father’s income
at age 40. Occupation typically varies over the course of a career and children report the
occupation of their father at a speciﬁc point in time. For instance, occupation when the
child was aged 17, may or may not correspond to occupation when the father was 40. If
not, then it is diﬃcult to use reported occupation at age 17 to assess father’s earnings
at age 40. There are further diﬃculties that diﬀer between the French and Japanese
surveys. In France, individuals are asked to report their father’s occupation at the time
they ﬁnished going to school : this is problematic because those who ﬁnish school later will
report the occupation of their father at a later stage of the father’s career. This would lead
to spurious correlation between father’s occupation and child’s education. In Japan, the
situation is diﬀerent. In some cases, individuals are asked to report their father’s occupation
without any indication regarding the period, in the father’s career. So it is unclear what
occupation is precisely reported. Yet, it is likely that younger cohorts (whose parents are
still active) will report current occupation of their father while older cohort will report
end of career occupation. Again, there is a distortion that may aﬀect our results. Lastly,
as documented in Lefranc and Trannoy (2005) using education as the only instrument or
using both education and occupation has a very limited impact on the estimated IGE.
The speciﬁcation used in the ﬁrst-step equation is the following :






k=1βkj(agei − 40)k) + εi
where yict denotes the earnings of the individual i, taken from the sample of fathers, who
belongs to the cohort c, at date t; αt is a time eﬀect, common to all cohorts (it may for
instance capture inﬂation, overall income growth, ...); Edij is a dummy variable that takes
the value 1 if individual i has the level of education j; agei is the age of individual i at
time t.
This equation assumes that the returns to education at the age of 40 diﬀer across cohorts
: for instance, in some cohorts, the premium attached to higher education can be bigger
than in other cohorts. In fact, there are no reason to expect that the coeﬃcients βc
0j will
remain unchanged across cohorts. It also assumes that the eﬀect of age on earnings varies
according to the level of education. We expect that the eﬀect is bigger for more educated
people.
How to predict from the above equation the earnings at the age of 40? Note the rela-
tionship between age, time and cohort : age = t−c. So age 40 corresponds to t = c+40. By
construction, the terms (agei − 40)k will be zero at age 40. So for an individual of cohort
c, the predicted earnings at age 40 is simply given by :




The problem is that for many cohorts, we won’t have a snapshot of their father’s
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we do estimate the values of βc
0j. But this is of little consequence, since this term is common
to all individuals of that cohort, independently of their level of education.
To be more speciﬁc, let {Ed
father
ij }i=1...ne denote a set of dummy variables characterizing
the education of the father of individual i. Let c denote the cohort of father of individual
i. The predicted father’s income for individual i takes the form :






The standard IGE equation is :
Yi = β + γ0Xi + εi





ij ) + εi




ij ) + εi
So controlling for the cohort of birth of the father (for instance, using a set of dummy
variables for each cohort or a polynomial function) in the second step equation is enough to





ij that we are able to estimate. Given child ’s age, we only exploit
variation in earnings among fathers of the same birth cohort but with diﬀerent educational
level. We do not rely on diﬀerences in father’s age, as a source of wage variation.
In our case, we want to estimate the IGE controlling for life-cycle eﬀects. For simplicity,
let us drop higher-order terms in age. The equation we wish to estimate is :
Yi = β + γ0Xi + γ1Xi × (agei − 40) + εi





ij )(γ0 + γ1(agei − 40)) + εi




ij )(γ0 + γ1(agei − 40)) + εi
Now to take care of the ﬁrst parenthesis on the right-hand side, we need to account for the
cohort of birth of the father (because of γ0αc+40) and the age of the individual (because
of γ1αc+40(agei − 40)). This can be done using dummies for father ’s birth cohort and
polynomial for individual age. To simplify things, if we assume that αt is a smooth function
of time, we can simply put a polynomial in the cohort of the father. Of course, we should
put an interaction between father ’s cohort and child ’s age.
Lastly, it is important to realize that if we don’t know, for each individual, the birth
cohort of his/her father, we will treat all children of a given age as having fathers of the
same birth cohort (in fact, a mix of diﬀerent likely cohorts). In this case, it is enough to
control for child ’s age.
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